Texas Family Code § 51.01

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TEXAS FAMILY CODE

TITLE 3.  JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE

CHAPTER 51.  GENERAL PROVISIONS

 

GO TO TEXAS CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY

 

Tex. Fam. Code § 51.01  (2011)

 

§ 51.01.  Purpose and Interpretation

 

This title shall be construed to effectuate the following public purposes:

(1) to provide for the protection of the public and public safety;

(2) consistent with the protection of the public and public safety:

(A) to promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts;

(B) to remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality from children committing certain unlawful acts; and

(C) to provide treatment, training, and rehabilitation that emphasizes the accountability and responsibility of both the parent and the child for the child’s conduct;

(3) to provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children coming within its provisions;

(4) to protect the welfare of the community and to control the commission of unlawful acts by children;

(5) to achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest of public safety and when a child is removed from the child’s family, to give the child the care that should be provided by parents; and

(6) to provide a simple judicial procedure through which the provisions of this title are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.

 

HISTORY: Enacted by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 544 (S.B. 111), § 1, effective September 1, 1973; am. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262 (H.B. 327), § 2, effective January 1, 1996.

 

LexisNexis (R) Notes:

 

 

 

CASE NOTES

 

 

 

 

 

1. In a disposition hearing, it violated a juvenile’s limited Fourteenth Amendment due process right of confrontation to admit a written probation report containing hearsay without balancing the right of confrontation with the State’s interest in not having to produce a witness; however, the error was harmless; under the principles set forth in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 juveniles have no right of confrontation during the disposition phase under the Sixth Amendment or Tex. Const. art. I, § 10 but have a limited right of confrontation under the Fourteenth Amendment. In re M.P., 220 S.W.3d 99, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 921 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).

 

 

 

2. As applied to juveniles, the registration procedure for persons convicted of sex-related offenses, Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. ch. 62, is nonpunitive in both intent and effect and therefore cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In so holding, the court recognized that children who violated the law were frequently treated less severely than adults, especially where a juvenile matter was adjudicated under the Texas Juvenile Justice Code, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.0161.107; the court found, however, that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.12(b)(1) indicated a clear intent to subject juveniles to registration and therefore, in a challenge to the constitutionality of the requirement, a juvenile had to show that it always constituted cruel and unusual punishment when applied to juveniles. In re D.L., 160 S.W.3d 155, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1447 (Tex. App. Tyler 2005).

 

 

 

3. In a disposition hearing, it violated a juvenile’s limited Fourteenth Amendment due process right of confrontation to admit a written probation report containing hearsay without balancing the right of confrontation with the State’s interest in not having to produce a witness; however, the error was harmless; under the principles set forth in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 juveniles have no right of confrontation during the disposition phase under the Sixth Amendment or Tex. Const. art. I, § 10 but have a limited right of confrontation under the Fourteenth Amendment. In re M.P., 220 S.W.3d 99, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 921 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).

 

 

 

4. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 was not violative of the constitution’s equal protection provisions because in enacting the statute, the legislature had furthered a compelling state interest by striking a balance between the state’s interest in providing for the care, protection, and development of its children, and its interest in providing protection and security for its general citizenry. In re S.B.C., 805 S.W.2d 1, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 292 (Tex. App. Tyler 1991).

 

5. Striking a balance between Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(1) and the protection of the public was vital, and the state’s interest in striking a balance between these goals was compelling. Because the determinate sentencing statutes furthered a compelling state interest, they did not violate the juvenile’s right to equal protection. In re R.L.H., 771 S.W.2d 697, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1690 (Tex. App. Austin 1989), criticized by In re D.W.R., 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7760 (Tex. App. San Antonio Dec. 16, 1998), criticized by In re K.D.V., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6457 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 17, 1997), criticized by In re M.R.R., 929 S.W.2d 687, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4225, 96:41 Tex. Civil Op. Serv. 69 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1996).

 

 

 

6. Where a minor was adjudged delinquent and faced confinement in a state training school not extending beyond his 21st birthday, denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus contending that his action of carrying a switch-blade knife resulted in a five year confinement where, as an adult, he could not have been confined for longer than a year for the same conduct was affirmed because, under former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1 § 13(c)(2) (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.), once a child was adjudged delinquent he could be confined for a period not beyond his 21st birthday for the purpose of rehabilitation; the minor’s equal protection argument was flawed as his status as a minor was a unique situation that required different treatment than an adult under the same circumstances. Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 1970 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1969).

 

 

 

7. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing appellant juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission for assault on a public servant. Appellant had a history of destructive behavior; he had violated the terms of his probation for prior delinquency adjudications; and he had received every rehabilitative resource available. In re J.F.S., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1290 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Feb. 17 2005).

 

 

 

8. In a murder case, denial of juvenile defendant’s motion to suppress was proper as probable cause existed to take defendant into custody from his home pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 as a stalled car he and his juvenile co-defendants possessed belonged to the victim, the murder recently occurred, and the teens appeared to be running away. Macias v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6307 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Aug. 9 2007).

 

9. In a murder case, juvenile defendant’s initial detention at a convenience store was proper as the circumstances surrounding his detention provided the officer with reasonable suspicion: defendant and his juvenile co-defendants appeared to be underage, out after the city’s curfew, in possession of a stalled car, and none had a driver’s license or formal identification. Macias v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6307 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Aug. 9 2007).

 

10. Court affirmed decision adjudicating juvenile as a delinquent under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.01 et seq. as it found sufficient legal and factual evidence to support the decision. In re J.K.R., 986 S.W.2d 278, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 8133 (Tex. App. Eastland 1998).

 

 

 

11. Trial court did not abuse its discretion under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f) when it revoked a juvenile’s probation for burglary and committed her to the Texas Youth Commission; because the commitment was not based entirely on her mother’s failure to pay restitution but was due in part to her own actions in violating the terms of probation, it was not inconsistent with the goals expressed in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01. In re S.A.G., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1929 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 14 2007).

 

12. In a juvenile defendant’s murder case, the trial court properly refused to submit his requested jury instruction tracking the language of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 because defense counsel read to the jury the proposed instruction during closing argument, and therefore the jury was made aware of the provisions, and the prosecutor’s comments concerning the need to incarcerate defendant were a permissible reference to the need to protect the welfare of the community as contemplated by § 51.01. In re E.C.D., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1270 (Tex. App. San Antonio Feb. 21 2007).

 

13. Order committing a juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) for an indeterminate amount of time was upheld where his continued delinquency and his repeated violations of his probation made it reasonable for the trial court to determine that TYC was the most effective way to protect the public and rehabilitate him. In re O.M., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9327 (Tex. App. Austin Oct. 25 2006).

 

14. Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s decision, pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04, to place the juvenile defendant in the custody of Texas Youth Commission (TYC) rather than probation because he participated in a premeditated assault and robbery, his father was an abusive alcoholic, and his mother did not realize the severity of his conduct or need for treatment; therefore defendant would not have received the care and supervision he needed if he remained in his home; under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01, the best interests of a child who engages in serious delinquent conduct is superseded to the extent it conflicts with public safety. In re G. G., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6310 (Tex. App. Austin July 21 2006).

 

15. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f) authorized a juvenile court to commit a juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) for violating a reasonable and lawful order where it was reasonable for the juvenile court to determine that rehabilitation of the juvenile in a family environment was inappropriate based upon his continued delinquency and the violations of his probation conditions; the juvenile had previously been placed on probation for multiple burglaries, admitted that he violated his probation by being suspended from school, and even though he was given a second chance to remain on probation rather than be committed to TYC if he improved his behavior, he had continued his delinquent conduct. In re I. P., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5108 (Tex. App. Austin June 15 2006).

 

16. Where the evidence showed that a juvenile set fire to a couch at school, he had been setting fires for quite some time at home, and the items he used came from his house, a trial court did not err by ordering the parents to pay $25,000 in restitution where the damages were over $100,000. In re D. M., 191 S.W.3d 381, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2601 (Tex. App. Austin 2006).

 

17. Juvenile offender’s placement on probation outside his home was proper, although the juvenile had been seriously injured before trial, because the State carried its burden of proof in showing, pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(5), that the removal of the juvenile from his home was necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety. His history of delinquent behavior supported a finding under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(c) that his mother could not provide the care, support, and supervision that he needed to meet the conditions of the probation. In re M.J.A., 155 S.W.3d 575, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 11016 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2004).

 

18. Different implied findings are required for initial dispositional order than in modified orders based on the fact that the primary concern of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code is public safety, and not the best interest of the child; therefore, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying a juvenile’s probation to reflect a commitment to the Texas Youth Commission where the evidence showed that the juvenile engaged in felony delinquent conduct, violated probation within a few days, and had many infractions after the original order was modified to place the juvenile in a detention center. In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 440, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 579 (Tex. 2004).

 

19. Under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01, three of the purposes expressed in the Juvenile Justice Code are to provide for the protection of the public and public safety, to promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts, and to protect the welfare of the community and to control the commission of unlawful acts by children. In re J.L.H., 58 S.W.3d 242, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6320 (Tex. App. El Paso 2001).

 

20. Under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(6) juveniles should be afforded more opportunity for appellate review of their claims, consistent with the stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code that it be construed to provide a simple judicial procedure through which the provisions of this title are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced. In re J.L.H., 58 S.W.3d 242, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6320 (Tex. App. El Paso 2001).

 

21. Trial court or the jury could grant probation for murder; probation was the preferred method of rehabilitation, and was to be achieved in the family environment, if possible under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01. In re D.I.B., 963 S.W.2d 862, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 961 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1998), affirmed by 988 S.W.2d 753, 1999 Tex. LEXIS 29, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 467 (Tex. 1999).

 

22. In deciding whether to waive jurisdiction, the juvenile court is required to consider whether the child can be rehabilitated through the use of the juvenile services and facilities that are currently available; the trial court is not required to evaluate the quality of the services offered the child in deciding whether to waive jurisdiction on the ground that rehabilitation, which is not the sole public purpose behind the handling of delinquent children, must be balanced against the welfare of the community and the protection of the public interest under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(2). In re T.D., 817 S.W.2d 771, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2413 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1991).

 

23. Defendant juvenile was properly convicted of burglary of a building as a habitual offender, and although juveniles were discriminated against by the use of a statute at the time defendant was convicted which used a previous conviction to enhance sentence, the courts had equalized the discrepancy under the equal protection clause. Casas v. State, 626 S.W.2d 805, 1981 Tex. App. LEXIS 4448 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1981).

 

24. Although the trial court declared the juvenile a delinquent pursuant to former Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1, § 3 (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.), error resulted when the trial court improperly modified the probation order when it did not find that the juvenile had engaged in delinquent conduct. In re H., 517 S.W.2d 652, 1974 Tex. App. LEXIS 2943 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1974).

 

25. Former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2338-1 (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.) did not give the state a right of appeal from an order of dismissal in a juvenile proceeding. State v. Marshall, 503 S.W.2d 875, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2070 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1973).

 

26. In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, a minor, even in a civil proceeding lacked the capacity to waive service, and no one could waive it for him; former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann art. 2338-1 (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.) did not provide that the personal appearance of a child dispensed with the requirement of notice to the child; juvenile delinquency proceedings were predominately civil in character and, under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, notice to a minor was required in civil cases. Casanova v. State, 489 S.W.2d 727, 1972 Tex. App. LEXIS 2095 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1972), reversed by 494 S.W.2d 812, 1973 Tex. LEXIS 267, 16 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 337 (Tex. 1973).

 

27. Trial court erred in overruling juveniles’ exception to state’s petitions alleging that juveniles were delinquent children under the law in that they habitually deported themselves so as to injure and endanger their morals because these allegations were mere conclusions and did not plead facts as required, under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, specifically former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2338.1 (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.). Viall v. State, 423 S.W.2d 186, 1967 Tex. App. LEXIS 2752 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1967).

 

 

 

28. Trial court had sufficient evidence to modify a juvenile’s disposition by committing him to a regional juvenile facility pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.05 and 51.01(1), because there was testimony that he punched his mother in the arm, that no other relatives would take him in, and that he had exhausted available services. In re J.M., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 902 (Tex. App. Amarillo Feb. 10 2009).

 

 

 

29. Juvenile defendant’s statement was voluntary because defendant’s rights were explained to her, defendant was read the written warnings on the statement, she stated that she understood the warnings, and she signed on the line below the warnings; defendant never invoked her right to remain silent or to seek counsel, and defendant did not make any indication that she was treated unfairly or was coerced in any way. Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6315 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2007).

 

30. Juvenile defendant knowingly and intelligently waived her rights in regard to her statements made in Illinois because defendant was aware of both the nature of the rights that she abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon those rights; those considerations were not affected by the absence of a magistrate; the procedures utilized were sufficient to carry out the underlying purpose of the Texas requirements. Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6315 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2007).

 

31. In an action in which a juvenile entered into an agreement to plead true to one count of delinquent conduct based on carrying a firearm in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.02, consideration of the juvenile’s age was appropriate and consistent, in determining whether he was in custody, with the stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code, which was, in part, to assure that juvenile received a fair haring and that their rights were recognized and enforced. In the Matter of D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2415 (Tex. App. El Paso 2002).

 

 

 

32. Trial court had sufficient evidence to modify a juvenile’s disposition by committing him to a regional juvenile facility pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.05 and 51.01(1), because there was testimony that he punched his mother in the arm, that no other relatives would take him in, and that he had exhausted available services. In re J.M., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 902 (Tex. App. Amarillo Feb. 10 2009).

 

33. Order committing a juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) for an indeterminate amount of time was upheld where his continued delinquency and his repeated violations of his probation made it reasonable for the trial court to determine that TYC was the most effective way to protect the public and rehabilitate him. In re O.M., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9327 (Tex. App. Austin Oct. 25 2006).

 

34. Trial court had sufficient evidence to support its finding that commitment was in appellant juvenile’s best interests for purposes of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(i), given that appellant had confessed to committing aggravated assault and entered a plea of true, and the trial court found that appellant required care that his home was unable to provide and was beyond the probation department’s ability to rehabilitate, and commitment was in society’s best interests; furthermore, although the purposes of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code were to be achieved in a family atmosphere when possible, commitment was necessary here for purposes of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(5), as appellant had a criminal past and behavioral problems. In re L.A.M., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 11249 (Tex. App. San Antonio Sept. 13 2006).

 

35. Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s decision, pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04, to place the juvenile defendant in the custody of Texas Youth Commission (TYC) rather than probation because he participated in a premeditated assault and robbery, his father was an abusive alcoholic, and his mother did not realize the severity of his conduct or need for treatment; therefore defendant would not have received the care and supervision he needed if he remained in his home; under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01, the best interests of a child who engages in serious delinquent conduct is superseded to the extent it conflicts with public safety. In re G. G., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6310 (Tex. App. Austin July 21 2006).

 

36. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f) authorized a juvenile court to commit a juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) for violating a reasonable and lawful order where it was reasonable for the juvenile court to determine that rehabilitation of the juvenile in a family environment was inappropriate based upon his continued delinquency and the violations of his probation conditions; the juvenile had previously been placed on probation for multiple burglaries, admitted that he violated his probation by being suspended from school, and even though he was given a second chance to remain on probation rather than be committed to TYC if he improved his behavior, he had continued his delinquent conduct. In re I. P., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5108 (Tex. App. Austin June 15 2006).

 

37. Where a juvenile who had been adjudicated delinquent for burglary violated her probation by skipping her day treatment program to go to the mall with her boyfriend, an order committing her to the Texas Youth Commission pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f) for the stated purpose of saving county resources did not conform to the stated goals of the juvenile justice code, as set forth in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01, and was not supported by sufficient evidence that probation had expended all resources in an effort to rehabilitate the juvenile or that she posed a threat to the community. In re S.G., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2560 (Tex. App. San Antonio Apr. 6 2005).

 

38. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing appellant juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission for assault on a public servant. Appellant had a history of destructive behavior; he had violated the terms of his probation for prior delinquency adjudications; and he had received every rehabilitative resource available. In re J.F.S., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1290 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Feb. 17 2005).

 

39. Trial court did not abuse its discretion under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11 in transferring a violent juvenile, who was a gang-involved drug abuser and had chronic behavior problems, to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the completion of a 20-year determinate sentence for reckless injury to a child with a deadly weapon since in the context of the penological goals of the juvenile justice system as set forth in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01, the determinate sentencing law is designed to subject violent juveniles who commit serious crimes to longer sentences than they would have served under the conventional juvenile system. In re J.D.P., 149 S.W.3d 790, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6415 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004).

 

40. Where appellant was charged with the burglary of his neighbors’ apartment and then critically wounded when he investigated a drive-by shooting across the street from his grandparents’ home before the case could be tried, the trial court abused its discretion in placing him on probation outside, rather than within, his home. There was very little evidence that appellant posed a threat to public safety after the shooting; and there was no evidence that the placement facility could provide the level of care appellant needed. In re M.J.A., 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4703 (Tex. App. San Antonio May 26 2004), opinion withdrawn by, substituted opinion at 155 S.W.3d 575, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 11016 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2004).

 

41. Different implied findings are required for initial dispositional order than in modified orders based on the fact that the primary concern of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code is public safety, and not the best interest of the child; therefore, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying a juvenile’s probation to reflect a commitment to the Texas Youth Commission where the evidence showed that the juvenile engaged in felony delinquent conduct, violated probation within a few days, and had many infractions after the original order was modified to place the juvenile in a detention center. In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 440, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 579 (Tex. 2004).

 

42. Where a juvenile committed the charges of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, burglary of a vehicle, and evading arrest, removing him from his mother’s home and placing him in Texas Youth Commission was necessary for his welfare. The juvenile did not have adequate supervision in the home and his behavior had not improved while under probation, spotlight, or counseling. In re J.T., 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2207 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 10 2004).

 

43. Striking a balance between Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(1) and the protection of the public was vital, and the state’s interest in striking a balance between these goals was compelling. Because the determinate sentencing statutes furthered a compelling state interest, they did not violate the juvenile’s right to equal protection. In re R.L.H., 771 S.W.2d 697, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1690 (Tex. App. Austin 1989), criticized by In re D.W.R., 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7760 (Tex. App. San Antonio Dec. 16, 1998), criticized by In re K.D.V., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6457 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 17, 1997), criticized by In re M.R.R., 929 S.W.2d 687, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4225, 96:41 Tex. Civil Op. Serv. 69 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1996).

 

44. Respondent state was not entitled to prosecute an appeal from an adverse decision on a petition for habeas corpus requiring it to discharge petitioner delinquent child from the custody of the Texas Youth Council. State v. Gonzales, 459 S.W.2d 947, 1970 Tex. App. LEXIS 2050 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1970).

 

45. Where a minor was adjudged delinquent and faced confinement in a state training school not extending beyond his 21st birthday, denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus contending that his action of carrying a switch-blade knife resulted in a five year confinement where, as an adult, he could not have been confined for longer than a year for the same conduct was affirmed because, under former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1 § 13(c)(2) (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.), once a child was adjudged delinquent he could be confined for a period not beyond his 21st birthday for the purpose of rehabilitation; the minor’s equal protection argument was flawed as his status as a minor was a unique situation that required different treatment than an adult under the same circumstances. Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 1970 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1969).

 

 

 

46. In a murder case, denial of juvenile defendant’s motion to suppress was proper as probable cause existed to take defendant into custody from his home pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 as a stalled car he and his juvenile co-defendants possessed belonged to the victim, the murder recently occurred, and the teens appeared to be running away. Macias v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6307 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Aug. 9 2007).

 

47. In a murder case, juvenile defendant’s initial detention at a convenience store was proper as the circumstances surrounding his detention provided the officer with reasonable suspicion: defendant and his juvenile co-defendants appeared to be underage, out after the city’s curfew, in possession of a stalled car, and none had a driver’s license or formal identification. Macias v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6307 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Aug. 9 2007).

 

 

 

48. After determining that a juvenile violated the conditions of probation by using illegal drugs, a court did not err under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(5) in placing the juvenile in the Texas Intermediate Sanctions Center (ISC) to complete the probationary term; the juvenile’s probation officer testified that placement in the ISC was in the juvenile’s best interest, and the juvenile’s grandmother approved of the placement. In re B. L. B., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3886 (Tex. App. Austin May 20 2010).

 

 

 

49. In an action in which a juvenile entered into an agreement to plead true to one count of delinquent conduct based on carrying a firearm in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.02, consideration of the juvenile’s age was appropriate and consistent, in determining whether he was in custody, with the stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code, which was, in part, to assure that juvenile received a fair haring and that their rights were recognized and enforced. In the Matter of D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2415 (Tex. App. El Paso 2002).

 

 

 

50. Juvenile defendant knowingly and intelligently waived her rights in regard to her statements made in Illinois because defendant was aware of both the nature of the rights that she abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon those rights; those considerations were not affected by the absence of a magistrate; the procedures utilized were sufficient to carry out the underlying purpose of the Texas requirements. Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6315 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2007).

 

 

 

51. Juvenile defendant’s statement was voluntary because defendant’s rights were explained to her, defendant was read the written warnings on the statement, she stated that she understood the warnings, and she signed on the line below the warnings; defendant never invoked her right to remain silent or to seek counsel, and defendant did not make any indication that she was treated unfairly or was coerced in any way. Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6315 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2007).

 

 

 

52. Under former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2338, § 13(3) and § 21, the minor relators were not entitled to release on an appeal bond from the finding that they were delinquent children because such an adjudication is civil rather than criminal and the release was discretionary and not a matter of right. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576, 1945 Tex. LEXIS 169, 160 A.L.R. 284 (Tex. 1945).

 

 

 

53. In a juvenile defendant’s murder case, the trial court properly refused to submit his requested jury instruction tracking the language of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 because defense counsel read to the jury the proposed instruction during closing argument, and therefore the jury was made aware of the provisions, and the prosecutor’s comments concerning the need to incarcerate defendant were a permissible reference to the need to protect the welfare of the community as contemplated by § 51.01. In re E.C.D., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1270 (Tex. App. San Antonio Feb. 21 2007).

 

 

 

54. Where the evidence showed that a juvenile set fire to a couch at school, he had been setting fires for quite some time at home, and the items he used came from his house, a trial court did not err by ordering the parents to pay $25,000 in restitution where the damages were over $100,000. In re D. M., 191 S.W.3d 381, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2601 (Tex. App. Austin 2006).

 

 

 

55. As applied to juveniles, the registration procedure for persons convicted of sex-related offenses, Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. ch. 62, is nonpunitive in both intent and effect and therefore cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In so holding, the court recognized that children who violated the law were frequently treated less severely than adults, especially where a juvenile matter was adjudicated under the Texas Juvenile Justice Code, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.0161.107; the court found, however, that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.12(b)(1) indicated a clear intent to subject juveniles to registration and therefore, in a challenge to the constitutionality of the requirement, a juvenile had to show that it always constituted cruel and unusual punishment when applied to juveniles. In re D.L., 160 S.W.3d 155, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1447 (Tex. App. Tyler 2005).

 

 

 

56. Under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(6) juveniles should be afforded more opportunity for appellate review of their claims, consistent with the stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code that it be construed to provide a simple judicial procedure through which the provisions of this title are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced. In re J.L.H., 58 S.W.3d 242, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6320 (Tex. App. El Paso 2001).

 

 

 

57. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing appellant juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission for assault on a public servant. Appellant had a history of destructive behavior; he had violated the terms of his probation for prior delinquency adjudications; and he had received every rehabilitative resource available. In re J.F.S., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1290 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Feb. 17 2005).

 

 

 

58. Pursuant to the purpose expressed in Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.01, the court reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment that excluded defendant’s written statement for the trial court to determine the effect of the magistrate’s absence on the admissibility of the statement given that defendant was not required to be brought before a magistrate in Illinois, but was so required in Texas in order to deter arresting officers from violating the Texas Code. Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613, 2002 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

 

 

 

59. Trial court did not abuse its discretion under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f) when it revoked a juvenile’s probation for burglary and committed her to the Texas Youth Commission; because the commitment was not based entirely on her mother’s failure to pay restitution but was due in part to her own actions in violating the terms of probation, it was not inconsistent with the goals expressed in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01. In re S.A.G., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1929 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 14 2007).

 

60. Order committing a juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) for an indeterminate amount of time was upheld where his continued delinquency and his repeated violations of his probation made it reasonable for the trial court to determine that TYC was the most effective way to protect the public and rehabilitate him. In re O.M., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9327 (Tex. App. Austin Oct. 25 2006).

 

61. Juvenile offender’s placement on probation outside his home was proper, although the juvenile had been seriously injured before trial, because the State carried its burden of proof in showing, pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(5), that the removal of the juvenile from his home was necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety. His history of delinquent behavior supported a finding under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(c) that his mother could not provide the care, support, and supervision that he needed to meet the conditions of the probation. In re M.J.A., 155 S.W.3d 575, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 11016 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2004).

 

62. Under the provisions of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(5), the Texas Juvenile Justice Code encourages maintaining the family’s role in the juvenile’s life whenever possible, and separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest of public safety; when a child is removed from the family, the child should be given the care that should be provided by parents. In re E.R.L., 109 S.W.3d 123, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 4781 (Tex. App. El Paso 2003).

 

63. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 was not violative of the constitution’s equal protection provisions because in enacting the statute, the legislature had furthered a compelling state interest by striking a balance between the state’s interest in providing for the care, protection, and development of its children, and its interest in providing protection and security for its general citizenry. In re S.B.C., 805 S.W.2d 1, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 292 (Tex. App. Tyler 1991).

 

64. Judgment finding a minor a delinquent child under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, former Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1 (now Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 et seq.), was affirmed because the jury properly first found the minor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder before the finding of delinquency. Joiner v. State, 494 S.W.2d 598, 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2203 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1973).

 

65. Under former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2338, § 13(3) and § 21, the minor relators were not entitled to release on an appeal bond from the finding that they were delinquent children because such an adjudication is civil rather than criminal and the release was discretionary and not a matter of right. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576, 1945 Tex. LEXIS 169, 160 A.L.R. 284 (Tex. 1945).

 

66. After determining that a juvenile violated the conditions of probation by using illegal drugs, a court did not err under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01(5) in placing the juvenile in the Texas Intermediate Sanctions Center (ISC) to complete the probationary term; the juvenile’s probation officer testified that placement in the ISC was in the juvenile’s best interest, and the juvenile’s grandmother approved of the placement. In re B. L. B., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3886 (Tex. App. Austin May 20 2010).

 

 

 

67. Reference to Title 3 in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(l) is a reference to that part of the Texas Family Code known as the Juvenile Justice Code, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.0161.107. In re A.N., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6097 (Tex. App. Eastland Aug. 6 2009).

 

68. Different implied findings are required for initial dispositional order than in modified orders based on the fact that the primary concern of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code is public safety, and not the best interest of the child; therefore, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying a juvenile’s probation to reflect a commitment to the Texas Youth Commission where the evidence showed that the juvenile engaged in felony delinquent conduct, violated probation within a few days, and had many infractions after the original order was modified to place the juvenile in a detention center. In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 440, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 579 (Tex. 2004).

 

 

 

LAW REVIEWS

 

1. 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 563, SPECIAL ISSUE: JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: ARTICLE: An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995, Spring, 1996.

 

TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS

 

1. 5-110 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 110.02, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, THE JUVENILE COURT, Scope of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

2. 5-110 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 110.08, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, THE JUVENILE COURT, Nature of Juvenile Jurisdiction, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

3. 5-110 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 110.201, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, THE JUVENILE COURT, Statutes, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

4. 5-111 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 111.01, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, ARREST AND PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS, Taking Child Into Custody, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

5. 5-113 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 113.01, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION, Disposition Hearing, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

6. 5-113 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 113.02, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION, Dispositional Alternatives, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

7. 5-113 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 113.200, JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION, Statutes, Texas Criminal Practice Guide.

 

8. Texas Courtroom Criminal Evidence § 16-1, TEXAS COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, CHAPTER 16. EVIDENCE LAW IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE, § 16-1. INTRODUCTION, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

 

9. Texas Family Law: Practice and Procedure C1.02, INITIATING ACTION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, DETERMINING JURISDICTION AND VENUE, Determining Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Texas Family Law: Practice and Procedure.

 

10. 51 Baylor L. Rev. 17, ARTICLE: Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas–It’s a Crime! Or Should Be *, Winter, 1999.

 

11. 56 SMU L. Rev. 1283, ANNUAL SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW: ARTICLE: Conflict of Laws, Summer, 2003.

 

12. 26 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1421, COMMENT: THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION FOR SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIMES: AN ALTERNATIVE TO DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN TEXAS, 1995.

 

13. 33 Houston Lawyer 24, ARTICLE: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: PAST AND PRESENT, by Judge Kent Ellis, November/December, 1995, Copyright (c) 1995 Houston Bar Association, The Houston Lawyer.

 

14. 2 SCHOLAR 49, COMMENT: Black Faces, Brown Faces.. .Why are we Different than White Faces? An Analytical Comparison of the Rate of Certification of Minority & Non-Minority Juvenile Offenders, 2000.

 

 

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